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We consider a model with two ￿rms operating their individual networks. Each
￿rm can choose its price as well as its investment to build up its network. Assuming
a skewed distribution of consumers, our model leads to an asymmetric market struc-
ture with one ￿rm choosing higher investments. While access regulation imposed
on the dominant ￿rm leads to lower prices, positive welfare e⁄ects are diminished
by strategic investment decisions of the ￿rms. Within a dynamic game with indirect
network e⁄ects leading to potentially increased demand, regulation can substantially
lower aggregate social welfare. Conditional access holidays can alleviate regulatory
failure.
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1 1 Introduction
The development of broadband networks such as VDSL and 3thrd generation mobile
networks promises a range of new services like triple play (telephone, TV and internet
services being o⁄ered over a single network), video telephony and other real time ser-
vices requiring high bandwidth and fast data transmission. However, to realize these
services existing bandwidth has to be increased via ￿ber to home, the buildup of new
mobile infrastructures or investments in cable networks to allow for data streams in both
directions. While these investments are substantial their economic value is uncertain.
Higher bandwidth and faster data transmission is not valuable per se. Customers￿will-
ingness to pay for connections to new networks depends on the services o⁄ered and thus
on complementary innovations in downstream markets. This interdependence between
innovations in vertically related markets points to potentially higher risks associated
with investments in new communication infrastructures. Additionally, the sunk nature
of infrastructure investments and network e⁄ects can lead to market failures as new
monopolies may emerge.
There is no widely held opinion on how regulation should react to the emergence of
new broadband infrastructures. The FCC turned a 180
￿
after a heated debate so much
so regulation is now on the retreat in the USA. The European regulation authorities
interpret the deployment of new infrastructures as a particularly complicated scenario
which calls for equally sophisticated regulation in order to guarantee that markets do
not return to the stable monopolies of former times.
The political debate is accompanied by a scienti￿c discussion in which both sides ￿nd
strong support. On the one hand, there are authors who emphasize the importance
of competition generated by unbundling and access regulation. Cave [4] and Cave and
Vogelsang [5] propose an investment ladder and interpret telecommunication networks as
a collection of potentially unbundled services which should be o⁄ered separately. Entrants
should be allowed to buy regulated access at any point in the network. Some of these
￿rms may climb higher on the ladder by investing in own infrastructures while others
may be satis￿ed with pure resale of unbundled services.
This idea of establishing di⁄erent types of competition, on the other hand, is challenged
by Bourreau and Dogan [2], [3]. They point out that there is a con￿ ict between facility
based and service based competition because access regulation diminishes the value of the
facilities owned by the incumbent as well as those owned by his competitors. Hazlet [10]
demonstrates that access regulation will typically hurt both, incumbents and potential
entrants. A simulation study by Zarakas et al. [15] indicates that investment would have
2been higher and more into facility and less into service based competition under higher
access rates.
Additional concerns are raised by authors who emphasize the importance of investment
incentives. They conclude that regulation authorities can or do not take su¢ cient care of
these incentives. Gans [7], for instance, points out that access regulation may lead to an
unnecessary delay of investment. Gans and King [8] and Pindyck [14] show that ex ante
uncertainty has to be taken into account when ex post regulation imposes restrictions on
prices. They suggest either a markup on prices motivated by the option pricing principle
or regulation holidays during which the regulation authority is committed not to interfere
with the market.
In this paper we focus on regulation in dynamic markets which exhibit network e⁄ects.
We consider a simple two period model with two ￿rms operating their own networks,
sunk investments in infrastructure and uncertainty about future demand. In each period
￿rms ￿rst decide on their investment, then they compete amongst each other to connect
consumers to their networks. Uncertainty about future demand is incorporated by as-
suming indirect network e⁄ects such that the probability of higher demand in the second
period depends positively on the number of connections in teh 1st period. Furthermore,
assuming a skewed distribution of consumers our model leads to an asymmetric market
structure with one ￿rm operating the greater network. With respect to regulation we
restrict the analysis to access regulation imposed on the dominant ￿rm, i.e., on the ￿rm
operating the greater network, but we consider di⁄erent regulatory regimes.
Our starting point is the observation that regulation faces a trade-o⁄ between ￿ exibility
and commitment: the government can either impose short run case by case decisions
which react ￿ exibly to the actual state of nature or it can ￿x its regulation decision
in the long run. While the latter su⁄ers from an obvious in￿ exibility the case by case
approach may reduce the ex ante commitment power of the regulator considerably.
We assume that the regulation authority must refrain from conditioning its policy on
future events. We distinguish the following regimes: Long run regulation ￿xes the access
price for both periods in advance and does not allow the regulator to react on the
realized demand or the ￿rms￿investment decisions. Medium run regulation maximizes
social welfare in each period without conditioning on the ￿rms￿investment decisions.
Short run regulation is based on both the realized demand and the investment. Since the
lack of commitment in medium and short run regulation will be shown to handicap the
regulator seriously, we will also introduce several commitment rules. More speci￿cally,
we explore the performance of regulation constrained by a zero-pro￿t condition, access
holidays conditioned on market development and a protected monopoly.
3While comparing these di⁄erent regulatory regimes, several e⁄ects have to be taken into
account. Though regulated prices increase static e¢ ciency they also alter the investment
decisions of the ￿rms. With respect to the smaller ￿rm, two e⁄ects have to be taken into
account. First, lower prices generally lead to lower investment. Second, regulation alters
the pricing game such that the smaller ￿rm￿ s investment incentives are increased ceteris
paribus. The welfare e⁄ect of this second e⁄ect can be negative as an unregulated market
may attract too much entry. Considering the dominant ￿rm regulation lowers investment
unambiguously. Furthermore, lack of regulatory commitment induces the ￿rms to reduce
investments further. With indirect network e⁄ects the probability of higher demand in
the second period is decreased which lowers expected welfare. Our example shows that
there is not much to gain but much to lose from regulation. With rather high investment
costs ￿rms refrain from investing under medium regulation. Long run regulation leads to
lower expected welfare when compared to an unregulated market. Regulation constrained
by a zero-pro￿t condition and access holidays can improve welfare but can not avoid a
breakdown of investment incentives completely.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the static and the dynamic allo-
cation problem. In section 3 we discuss the interplay between pro￿t maximizing ￿rms and
a welfare maximizing regulator in a static set-up. In section 4 we introduce uncertainty
about future demand and the network e⁄ect and demonstrate that the regulator has
severe problems in dealing with the implied consequences. Section 5 considers medium
run regulation amended by a zero-pro￿t restriction, access holidays as well as a protected
but otherwise not regulated monopoly. In section 6 we will shortly summarize our main
￿ndings.
2 The Model
2.1 The Allocation Problem
We consider a model with two ￿rms M and N each operating a network of size m and n,
respectively. Consumers are distributed in the interval [0;1] according to a distribution
function F(￿) with
F0(￿) = f(￿) ￿ 0;f0(￿) < 0 for all ￿ < 1 and f(1) = 0: (1)
The mass of consumers is normalized to one. Consumers located at ￿ can connect to
network j = m;n if ￿ ￿ j. We assume that consumers have a quasi-linear utility function
with constant marginal utility of income normalized to 1. Thus, demand for connections
4to either network m or n depends on the network prices p and q respectively, and on a
shift parameter ￿. Let X(p;q;￿) and Y (p;q;￿) denote demand for connections to m
and n. We assume that X and Y have the following properties1
Xp < 0 and Xpp ￿ 0 8 p with X > 0; (2)
Yq < 0 and Yqq ￿ 0 8 q with Y > 0; (3)
0 < Xq;Yp < jXpj; 0 < Yp;Xq < jYqj; 0 ￿ Xpq;Yqp 8 p;q with X;Y > 0 (4)
Firms can decide on their prices p and q and the size of their networks m and n. Through-
out the paper we assume that investments in m and n are irreversible, that is, ￿rms can
not decrease the size of their networks, and that investment decisions are made prior
to their pricing decisions Firms bear constant marginal costs c > 0 for connecting con-
sumers. Fixed costs are linearly increasing with the size of the ￿rms￿networks. Assuming
m ￿ n and de￿ning ~ X(p;￿) := X(p;1;￿), pro￿ts ￿m and ￿n are given by
￿m(p;q;￿;m;n) = (F(m) ￿ F(n))(p ￿ c) ~ X + F(n)(p ￿ c)X ￿ rm (5)
￿n(p;q;￿;n;z) = F(n)(q ￿ c)Y ￿ rn (6)
where r > 0 measures the marginal (annualized) network costs. To simplify the analysis
we impose the following restriction for the relation between costs and demand
(p ￿ c)X(p;0;￿) <
r
f(0)
and (q ￿ c)Y (0;q;￿) <
r
f(0)
8 p;q ￿ 0: (7)
Denoting consumers￿indirect utility functions by2







(Xd^ p + Y d^ q)
and de￿ning G(m;n) := F(m) ￿ F(n) and H(n) = F(n) total welfare is given by
W = G~ V + HV + ￿m + ￿n:
Within this framework we analyze the impact of access obligations imposed on the net-
work operator M who is assumed to install the greater network. We assume that access
1Subscripts denote partial derivatives. To simplify the notation we will omit the arguments of the
functions where this does not lead to any confusion. In our numerical example we will use a linear
speci￿cation with zero cross derivatives.
2We can use the line integral for de￿ning V (￿) since demand does not depend on income. Hence the
order of integration is not relevant.
5leads to perfect competition for the consumers connecting to M. Given m ￿ n and that
M has to provide access for an access charge a, the price p can not exceed a + c. There-
fore, access regulation is equivalent to direct price regulation of the dominant network
provider. To simplify the analysis further, we also assume that the regulator has complete
information.
2.2 Dynamics
In order to generate a dynamic investment problem we assume that this market is re-
peated twice with the shift parameter ￿1 in the ￿rst period and an uncertain shift
parameter in the second period. We assume that demand is potentially increasing and
that the probability of an increase depends on the total quantity of connections in the
￿rst period. Using subscripts to denote network sizes and number of connections in period
1 and 2, we assume that the second period shift parameter is
e ￿ =
(
￿2 with probability ￿(Q(￿))
￿1 with probability 1 ￿ ￿(Q(￿))
(8)
with : Q(￿) := G e X1 + H(X1 + Y1) (9)
with ￿2 > ￿1 and ￿0 > 0 > ￿00. Note that ￿ depends on the aggregate amount of
connections in period 1, i.e., we model industry speci￿c network e⁄ects rather than ￿rm
speci￿c network e⁄ects. Moreover, with this speci￿cation we capture indirect network
e⁄ects which could result from the observation that the incentives of service providers
to develop new applications are positively correlated with the size of their markets, i.e.,
the number of consumers connected to the networks.
2.3 Regulation
Second Best Regulation As we will not allow side payments to the ￿rms throughout
the following the second best optimal solution of this allocation problem is a natural
reference point. With second best regulation, the regulator is able to choose ex ante
pricing rules which depend on the entire observable history h up to the moment when




p￿ if h = h￿
0 otherwise
(10)
6which enforces the history h￿ of his choice with the threat of a zero price punishment for
deviators.
Third Best Regulation Constraints It is the central goal to introduce the trade-
o⁄s between ￿ exibility and commitment of third best regulation into this model. For
this purpose we restrict the regulation policy in a simple manner. We assume that the
regulator ￿xes prices and that he can only condition his pricing policy on observable
past history. In order to gain full ￿ exibility he has to wait until the shift of demand is
realized and until the investment decisions are implemented. To have full commitment the
regulator has to ￿x his price in advance without being able to even react to a demand shift.
This way we distinguish three third best regulation regimes: The long run regulator (LR)
￿xes a price in stage 0.5 before the market starts, the medium run regulator (MR) selects
a pricing policy pm after the demand shift is observable, and the short run regulator (SR)
picks a fully ￿ exible pricing policy ps conditional also on the ￿rms￿investment decisions.
The resulting decision structure is shown in table 2 with the understanding that only
one type of regulator is active.
Agent Period 1 Period 2
0.5 LR p = p








3 N q1 q2
Timing of Decisions
We will demonstrate each of these regimes to be ￿ awed. In the dynamic game we will
therefore also discuss, to what extent it is possible to overcome regulatory failure by
partial commitment devices. We will introduce zero pro￿t constraints for the MR as well
as access holidays h under which the regulator does not become active unless he observes
either ￿1 or a persistent monopoly in period 2. We also compare the outcomes with a
protected and unregulated monopoly pm where the regulator does not allow competition.
To disentangle the quite complex consequences of these regimes we will ￿rst analyze a
simple one period model. We then turn to the more complicated two period model.
73 One Period Regulation
In the following we will ￿rst characterize the equilibrium conditions for second best
regulation and for an unregulated market outcome. We then derive the optimal regulatory
decisions under MR and SR. To illustrate the results and to analyze the impact of
regulation on welfare in more detail we use a numerical example.
3.1 Second Best Solution
Consider ￿rst the benchmark solution in which we determine the potential welfare gain by
assuming that the pricing rule p￿ is only restricted by the ￿rms￿participation constraint
condition. The ￿rms decide on their investments and their prices such that p satis￿es
p ￿ p￿. Focusing on the mechanism speci￿ed in (10), assume that both ￿rms adhere to m￿
and n￿, respectively. Then, the regulated equilibrium prices are given p￿ and q￿ = qr(p￿)
implicitly de￿ned by
￿n
q = H [(q ￿ c)Yq + Y ] = 0 (11)
for all n￿ > 0. Additionally, we have q￿0 > 0 which is due to Yp;Yqp ￿ 0.
Considering the ￿rms￿investment decisions, (10) implies that deviation from m￿ or n￿
can not be optimal as long as
￿m(p￿;q￿;￿;m￿;n￿) ￿ 0 and (12)
￿n(p￿;q￿;￿;m￿;n￿) ￿ ￿n(p￿;q￿(0;n);￿;m￿;n) 8 n 6= n￿;n < m￿: (13)
While (12) establishes the usual zero pro￿t constraint for the dominant ￿rm, (13) together
with (7) implies an equivalent positive pro￿t constraint for the smaller ￿rm. Therefore,
the optimal choice of p￿;m￿ and n￿ can be derived from maximizing
L￿(￿) = G~ V + HV + (1 ￿ ￿)￿m + (1 ￿ ￿)￿n (14)
with respect to p￿;m￿;n￿ (￿ and ￿ with ￿;￿ ￿ 0 denote the multipliers for (12) and
(13)). Using (11) the ￿rst order conditions for L￿ are given by3
L￿





+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿n
p (15)
L￿
m = f(m￿)~ V + (1 ￿ ￿)￿m





f(m￿)~ V < 0 (17)
L￿
n = ￿f(n)(~ V ￿ V ) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿m
n + (1 ￿ ￿)￿n
n ￿ 0;L￿






f(n￿)(~ V ￿ V ) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿m
n
i
for n > 0 (19)
with : f(n￿)(~ V ￿ V ) < 0 and ￿m
n = ￿f(n￿)(p￿ ￿ c)( ~ X ￿ X) < 0
3In order to simplify the notation we ommit the indices of all variables indicating partial derivatives.
8Considering ￿ and ￿ ￿rst, ￿ = 0 can be excluded by inspection of (16) and f(1) = 0. On
the other hand, ￿n(q￿;p￿;m￿;n￿) ￿ 0 may not be binding. Inspection of (19) shows that
regulation leads to ￿n
n > 0 and thus to ￿n ￿ 0 as long as ~ V ￿ V + (1 ￿ ￿)(p￿ ￿ c)( ~ X ￿
X) > 0 holds. With the two networks being rather close substitutes from the consumers￿
perspective,
￿
￿ ￿~ V ￿ V
￿
￿ ￿ is small while (p￿ ￿ c)( ~ X ￿ X) is strictly bounded away from zero.











which mirrors the generalized Ramsey price.
3.2 Market outcome without Regulation
Turning to the case without regulation we assume m > n w.l.o.g. The ￿rms￿￿rst order




(p ￿ c) ~ Xp + ~ X
i
+ H [(p ￿ c)Xp + X] = 0 (21)
￿n
q = H [(q ￿ c)Yq + Y ] = 0 (22)
Note that Xpq;Yqp > 0 and Xq;Yp > 0 imply that prices are strategic complements and
that ~ Xpq ￿ 0 leads to
(pc ￿ c) ~ Xp + ~ X > 0 > (pc ￿ c)Xp + X: (23)
(23) indicates that choosing its price the dominant provider compromises between
monopoly pro￿ts in the region G(m;n) and competition in region H(n). Letting pc(m;n)
and qc(n;m) denote the solutions of (21) and (22), simple comparative statics reveals
sign pc
m = ￿sign ￿m
pm￿n
qq > 0 since ￿m
pm = f(m)
h




m = sign ￿m
pm￿n
qp > 0 since ￿n
qp = H [(qc ￿ c)Yqp + Yp] > 0: (25)
and
sign pc
n = ￿sign ￿m
pn￿k
qq < 0 since ￿m








n = sign ￿m
pn￿k
qp < 0 since ￿n
qp = H [(qc ￿ c)Yqp + Yp] < 0 (27)
9Turning to the ￿rms￿investment decisions, using (25) and (26) and employing the enve-
lope theorem we get
￿m
m = f(m)(pc ￿ c) ~ X + H(pc ￿ c)Xqqc
m ￿ r = 0 (28)
) f(m)(pc ￿ c) ~ X ￿ r = ￿H(pc ￿ c)Xqqc
m < 0 (29)
￿n
n = f(n)(qc ￿ c)Y + H(qc ￿ c)Yppc
n ￿ r ￿ 0; ￿n
n n = 0 (30)
) f(n)(pc ￿ c)Y ￿ r = ￿H(qc ￿ c)Yppc
n > 0 for n > 0 (31)
Inspection of (29) and (31) shows that the investment decisions of both M and N are
in￿ uenced by the e⁄ects which m and n have on price competition. While M has an
incentive to increase its network in order to soften price competition, N has a strategic
incentive to decrease n. Note that these strategic e⁄ects are in line with second best
regulation as long as the networks are rather close substitutes (see (17) and (19), respec-
tively).
3.3 Medium Run Regulation
In contrast to second best regulation medium run regulation restricts the regulator to
choose an ex ante price and not a pricing rule. Therefore, medium run regulation does
not only limit the strategy space of the regulator, it also leads to di⁄erent strategic e⁄ects
with respect to the ￿rms￿investment decisions. More precisely, the investment incentives
of N are ceteris paribus higher as compared to second best regulation and to competition.
Using the timing speci￿ed in section 1.3 we start with the ￿rms￿pricing decisions. As-
suming that regulation is binding, the optimal price qm of ￿rm N is again given by
qr(pm) (see (11)). Employing the envelope theorem the ￿rms￿investment decisions are
characterized by
￿m
m = f(m)(pm ￿ c) ~ X ￿ r = 0 (32)
￿n
n = f(n)(qm ￿ c)Y ￿ r ￿ 0; ￿n
nn = 0 (33)
Inspection of (32) and (33) shows that the ￿rms￿network sizes only depend on pm and
that there are no strategic e⁄ects the ￿rms take into account. Let mm(pm) and nm(pm)
denote the solutions of (32) and (33), respectively, and note that simple comparative
statics leads to
sign mm0 = sign f(m)
h
~ X + (pm ￿ c) ~ Xp
i
> 0: (34)
sign nm0 = sign f(n)[(qm ￿ c)Yp] > 0: (35)
10Turning to the optimal price pm and taking into account that the ￿rms are free to choose
their investment levels, the regulator￿ s maximization problem can be written as
max
pm Wm = G~ V + HV + ￿m + ￿n (36)
Employing the envelope theorem leads to
Wm
p = G(￿ ~ X) + H(￿X ￿ Y qm0) + ￿m
p + ￿m
q qm0 + ￿n
p (37)
+mm0f(m)~ V ￿ nm0f(nm)
h
(~ V ￿ V ) + (pm ￿ c)( ~ X ￿ X)
i
Comparing (37) with the respective ￿rst order condition under second best regulation,
i.e., (15), shows that the pricing problem is complicated by the impact which pm has on
the ￿rms￿investment decisions. While mm0f(m)~ V and nm0f(nm)~ V are strictly positive
(see (34) and (35)), the sign of the last term on the RHS of (37) depends on the degree
of substitution between the ￿rms￿networks. With networks being close substitutes we
again have (~ V ￿ V ) + (pm ￿ c)( ~ X ￿ X) > 0 and a decrease in n has a positive e⁄ect on
welfare. Note further, that this allows for solutions pm such4
f(0)(qm ￿ c)Y ￿ r = 0 and mm0f(m)~ V > ￿F(mm)(pm ￿ c) ~ Xp: (38)
This kind of solution underlines two properties of medium run regulation. First, regu-
lation can serve as a commitment device to keep prices low and to deter entry which
may also increase the pro￿ts of the regulated ￿rm. Second, amending medium run regu-
lation with the option to forbid entry can increase welfare. Forbidding market entry and
choosing pm such that
mm0f(m)~ V = ￿F(mm)(pm ￿ c) ~ Xp
would clearly raise social welfare.
3.4 Short Run Regulation
The third regulatory regime we consider is the case in which the regulator chooses the
access price ps after the ￿rms have made their investments but before the smaller network
selects its price qs.
Since we again have qs = qr(ps), the regulator chooses ps according to
Ws
p = G(￿ ~ X) + H(￿X ￿ Y qs0) + ￿m
p + ￿m
q qs0 + ￿n
p = 0 (39)





p ￿ c)Y ￿ r] < 0 as n
p(p
p) tends to 0.




G ~ Xp + H(Xp + qs0Xq)
i





Using Xq < jXpj; qs0 = ￿ [(qs ￿ c)Yqp + Yp]/[(qs ￿ c)Yqq + 2Yq] < 1 and qr(ps) reveals





While it is di¢ cult to determine the sign of the RHS in (41) under general demand






and therefore to ex post regulated prices above marginal costs. Since (ps ￿ c) > 0 is
a necessary condition for any investment to take place, we continue by assuming that
(42) holds. Furthermore, letting ps(m;n) denote the solution of (40) simple comparative








n = sign[f(n)(qs ￿ c)(Yp + qs0Yq) + (ps ￿ c)(￿ e Xp + Xp + qs0Xq)] > 0 (44)




f(m)(ps ￿ c) ~ X + ps
mG
h
(ps ￿ c) ~ Xp + ~ X
i
+ps
mH [(ps ￿ c)(Xp + Xqqs0) + X]
#
￿ r = 0 (45)
￿n
n = f(n)(qs ￿ c)Y + ps
nH(qs ￿ c)Yp ￿ r ￿ 0; ￿n
n n = 0 (46)
Hence, while ￿rm M0s investment is determined by ps the strategic e⁄ect with respect
to anticipated regulation tends to decrease m further (see (43)). On the other hand,
(44) reveals that ￿rm N can increase ps by increasing its own network. Comparing these
observations with the results under second best regulation and under an unregulated
market outcome shows that short run regulation turns the strategic behavior of the ￿rms
upside down.
Finally, note that once networks are given (40) does not ensure positive pro￿ts. In fact,
the two period model shows that negative second period pro￿ts due to (40) can lead to
a complete breakdown of ￿rst period investments.
123.5 Example
In order to illustrate the above results and to compare the welfare implications of the
di⁄erent regimes we now analyze a numerical example. The distribution function is given
by
F(￿) = ￿(2 ￿ ￿)
The demand functions e X; X and Y are5






(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)
+
￿q






(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)
+
￿p
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)
with : ￿ = 0:75 and ￿ = 1;2
For the ￿rms costs we assume c = 0 and r 2 [0:02;0:55]6.
The following graphs compare the ￿rms￿prices, network sizes, pro￿ts, and the aggregate
welfare for the second best solution (￿), the market outcome without regulation (c), and
for short (s) and medium (m) run regulation.
Prices without regulation are obviously too high. No matter which regime we compare
with the unregulated outcome, prices are always signi￿cantly lower with regulation.












Prices p with ￿ = 1











Prices q with ￿ = 1
5These functions can be derived from a simple Dixit utiliy function.
6The upper limit for r is due to the analysis of the dynamic model in the next section.












Prices p with ￿ = 2












Prices q with ￿ = 2
However, the network sizes are not uniformly smaller under regulation. With the second
best solution, the reason for a larger network m is easily explained. Since network sizes
are restricted by the participation constraints rather than by incentive compatibility, m
can be chosen such that the marginal social value of network expansion equals its shadow
costs. On the other hand, the second best solution does not call for a uniformly larger
network n. The interdependence of the two pro￿t functions implies that an increase of
n must be accompanied by an increase of p. Therefore we have nc > n￿ for medium (for
￿ = 1) and large (for ￿ = 2) values of r.











Network m with ￿ = 1











Network n with ￿ = 1










Network m with ￿ = 2











Network n with ￿ = 2
Under medium run regulation the lower prices generate the expected change of m. Given
pm < pc, M reduces its investments by choosing a smaller network than it would under
unregulated competition. On the other hand, increasing n does not a⁄ect pm. Thus, the
investment incentives of N are higher and we get nm > nc for small r or high demand,
i.e., ￿ = 2.
Under short run regulation the incentive problem is drastic. Prices are set after the
network sizes have been chosen so that the regulator does not care for disincentive e⁄ects.
While the regulator ￿xes ps above short run marginal costs the low pro￿t margin can
not avoid a market breakdown as we have m = n = 0 for medium and large r.
Comparing welfare in the four allocations shows that while the second best solution
clearly dominates neither of the two third best regulation regimes is able to realize a
signi￿cant part of this potential surplus. While short run regulation fails miserably, the
allocation under medium run regulation is only slightly better than the unregulated
outcome.










Welfare with ￿ = 1










Welfare with ￿ = 2
15A short look at the ￿rms￿pro￿ts reveals that similar welfare does not mean similar
allocation. Every regulation regime leads to a redistribution of rents from the ￿rms to
consumers (as long as there is no market breakdown). For ￿ = 1 and medium network
costs, the redistribution under medium run regulation is at the expense of N while M
pro￿ts from regulation. This case re￿ ects the above mentioned scenario in which regula-
tion aims to deter entry in order to increase the investment incentives of the regulated
￿rm.













Pro￿ts ￿m with ￿ = 1













Pro￿ts ￿n with ￿ = 1












Pro￿ts ￿m with ￿ = 2












Pro￿ts ￿n with ￿ = 2
4 The Dynamic Model
We now turn to the analysis of the two period model in which demand in the second
period can be either the same or higher as compared to the ￿rst period. Due to the
assumed network e⁄ect (see (8)) the probability of high demand in period 2 increases
16with the number of connections supplied in period 1. Hence, both ￿rms as well as the
regulator have an incentive to increase their networks and to lower prices in period
1. Taking into account that investments are irreversible ￿rst period investments have
to balance the positive e⁄ects from increasing the probability for higher demand and
the potential second period losses if demand does not increase. With regulation this
consideration is complicated by the fact that the regulator can base its second period
decisions on existing networks. Our example shows that the implied ratchet e⁄ect under
medium run regulation leads to signi￿cant welfare losses for medium and high investment
costs.
4.1 Second Best Regulation
Starting with second best regulation note ￿rst that the regulator can condition its second
period decisions on all past decisions. That is, the regulator can choose a second period
pricing rule which depends on ￿rst and second period investments as well as on ￿rst
period prices. This allows the regulator to control all investment decisions as well as ￿rst
period prices.










22) denote the vector of the regulator￿ s
decision variables (in the following the ￿rst subscript refers to the period, the second to
the realized demand in period 2, i.e., to either ￿1 = 1 or ￿2 = 2). Taking into account
the ￿rms￿zero pro￿t conditions and using q￿
2i = qr(p￿
2i) the regulator￿ s maximization
problem can be formulated as (0 < ￿ ￿ 1 denotes the discount factor):
max
￿





￿(G22~ V22 + H22V22 + ￿m
22 + ￿n
22)




s.t. : E￿m := ￿m
1 + ￿[￿￿m
22 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿m
21] ￿ 0 (48)
: E￿n := ￿n
1 + ￿[￿￿n
22 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿n
21] ￿ 0 (49)









where e ￿ refers to the optimal ex ante punishment if N deviates by choosing (n1;q1) 6=
(n￿
1;q￿
1) in the ￿rst period. In the following we assume that negative second period pro￿ts
implied e p2i = 0 with i = 1;2 ensure that (50) holds.
Comparing (47) with the static case and focusing on second period decisions, m￿
1 > 0 or
n￿
1 > 0 allow for corner solution such that no further investment takes place in the second
17period. With indirect network e⁄ects this will be the case whenever demand remains low
in the second period.
Turning to the ￿rst period variables let ￿;￿ ￿ 0 and  m
i ; n
i ￿ 0 with i = 1;2 denote the
Lagrange multipliers for (48), (49) and (51). De￿ning W￿
2i := G2i~ V2i+H2iV2i+￿m
2i +￿n
2i




















G1(￿ ~ X1) + H1(￿X1) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿m






















H1(￿Y1) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿m










q < 0. Note that the second row of @L/@p￿
1 and @L/@q￿
1, respectively, is due
to the assumed network e⁄ect. Since welfare is strictly increasing in demand we must
have W22 > W21 and p￿
1 as well as q￿
1 tend to be lower when compared to the static case.
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1)(~ V1 ￿ V1) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿m
1n + (1 ￿ ￿)￿n
1n
+￿￿0Q￿
n(W22 ￿ W21) +  n
2 +  n
1
#
The network e⁄ect implies an increase of m￿
1 and n￿
1. This is simply due to Q￿
m =
f(m￿
1) e X1 > 0 and Q￿
n = f(n￿
1)(￿ e X1 + X1 + Y1) > 0. Furthermore, considering the
in￿ uence of  m
2 ; n
2 ￿ 0 (54) and (55) indicate that irreversibility reduces the optimal
network investments in the ￿rst period.
4.2 Market outcome without Regulation
Analyzing the market game without regulation the second period can be easily char-
acterized. While prices pc
2i(m2i;n2i) and qc
2i(n2i;m2i) are given by the solutions of (21)
18and (22), investment decisions depend on m1 and n1. Using the envelope theorem and
















(n2i ￿ n1) = 0: (56)
Let mc
2i(m1;n1) and nc
2i(m1;n1) denote the solutions of (56). Expected pro￿ts in the ￿rst
period are given by
E￿mc : = ￿m
1 + ￿[￿￿mc
22 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿mc
21 ] ￿ 0 (57)
E￿nc : = ￿n
1 + ￿[￿￿nc
22 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿nc
21] ￿ 0 (58)
Maximizing expected pro￿ts with respect to p1 and q1 leads to (using Qc := G1 ~ X1 +














21) = 0: (60)
The network e⁄ect gives both ￿rms an incentive to lower their prices in order to increase
the probability of high demand in the second period. Note further, that this incentive
tends to be higher for ￿rm M since a decrease of p1 increases the quantities on both
market segments G1 and H1. Furthermore, the strategic complementarity between p1
and q1 does not change since we have
￿00 < 0 and Qc
pq = H1(X1pq + Y1qp) > 0.
Turning to the optimal investment in period 1, let pc
1(m1;n1) and pc
1(m1;n1) denote the






















































































2i are kinked functions, we use partial derivatives de￿ned as lim e m1&mi @m
c
2i/@ e m1
and lime n1&ni @n
c
2i/@e n1.
19The direct impact of m1 and n1 on ￿ again leads to higher investment incentives when
compared to the static case. Considering the investment incentives of ￿rm M note that
while we have d￿mc
21 /dm1 < 0 , mc
21 = m1, the potential losses due to high investments
in the ￿rst period are alleviated by a corresponding increase in pc
21. In contrast, with
nc
21 = n1 a further increase in n1 would also intensify second period price competition.
Therefore, the di⁄erence between the ￿rms￿incentives to invest in the ￿rst period tends
to be higher as compared to the one period game.
4.3 Medium Run Regulation















2in(n2i ￿ n1) = 0: (65)
Since ￿rms are free to choose their investments in both period the regulator￿ s decision





= G(￿ ~ X2i) + H(￿X2i ￿ Y2iqm0
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Comparing (66) with (37) shows that the regulator has essentially two options. Either
he economizes on the given network sizes and chooses pm
2i in accordance with short run
regulation (see (39)) or he selects pm
2i in order to induce further investments. While
the ￿rms￿pro￿ts are strictly positive in the latter case, prices according to short run
regulation can obviously lead to negative pro￿ts. Note further, that short run regulation
is more likely to be optimal the greater the investments in the ￿rst period.
Turning to ￿rst period decisions, let pm
2i(m1;n1) denote the solution of (66) and let
￿mm
2i (m1;n1) and ￿nm
2i (n1;m1) denote the ￿rms￿reduced pro￿t functions in period 2.
Given m1 and n1 as well as pm
1 , the optimal price qm







21 ) = 0: (67)
20With qm
1 (m1;n1;pm

































































While the direct impact of m1 as well as n1 on ￿ points to higher investments incentives,
the potential negative e⁄ect of d￿mc
21 /dm1 is rather high. With m21 = m1 and n21 = n1
an increase of m1 increases the expected losses due to regulation if the regulator adheres
to short run regulation in the second period. Our example shows that this ratchet e⁄ect
may well imply strong underinvestment in period 1, that is, it can lead to a situation in
which ￿rms do not invest in the ￿rst period.
Finally, let mm
1 (p1) and nm
1 (p1) denote the solutions of (68) and (69). and consider the
optimal choice of pm
1 . Using Wm
2i to denote realized welfare in period 2, the resultant ￿rst
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1 indicates the impact which pm
1 has on mm
1 and nm
1 and thus on welfare
in the second period if it is optimal to economize on existing networks instead of inducing
further investments. The network e⁄ect is again taken into account by the third row in
(70). While the ￿rst term is clearly negative, the last two terms show that the regulator
has an incentive to compensate the potential ratchet e⁄ect by increasing pm





















214.4 Long Run Regulation
Compared to medium run regulation, long run regulation requires the regulator to choose
a price which holds in both periods. While this restricts the regulator￿ s ￿ exibility it is a
simple mechanism to overcome the ratchet e⁄ect associated with medium run regulation.
The ￿rms￿decisions concerning prices and network investments in the second period are
analogous to medium run regulation. Thus, let pl denote the regulated price ￿xed in
period 1 and let ml
2i(m1;n1;pl) and nm
2i(n1;m1;pl) denote the solutions of
￿ml
2im ￿ 0; ￿ml
2im(m2i ￿ m1) = 0 and ￿nl
2in ￿ 0; ￿nl
2in(n2i ￿ n1) = 0 (71)
with ql
2i = qr(pl). Turning to the ￿rst period, ￿rm￿ s N optimal price ql








21) = 0: (72)
Letting ql



































































Comparing (73) and (74) with (68) and (69) reveals that the ￿rms￿strategic consid-





2i /dn1 is equal to the losses from overinvestment in the one period model. There-
fore, the ratchet e⁄ect present under medium run regulation vanishes.
Finally, let ml
1(pl) and nl
1(pl) denote the solutions of (73) and (74) and let Wl
2i denote
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dpl = G1 ~ X0






























As expected, the optimal price under long run regulation has to balance the direct welfare
e⁄ects in period 1, the positive e⁄ects due to the network e⁄ect and the impact which
regulation has on welfare in the second period. Compared to medium run regulation a
relatively high price pl not only stimulates investment in the ￿rst period, it also induces
the prospect of higher pro￿ts if demand shifts upwards in the second period. There-
fore, the consideration between exploiting the network e⁄ect and providing investment
incentives points to pl > pm
1 .
4.5 Example
Starting with second best regulation, indirect network e⁄ects lead to lower prices and
higher investments of M when compared to the one period model.8 With medium run
regulation and unregulated competition, the relationship between ￿rst period prices p1
and network sizes m1 is similar to the relationship in the one period model provided
network costs are low.














First period prices of M















First period networks of M
8We left out the prices and the net sizes of N. The discontinuities indicate, where N leaves the market
under the di⁄erent regimes.
23With higher investment costs the above mentioned ratchet e⁄ect under medium run
regulation becomes crucial. Negative ￿rst period payo⁄s and second period losses due to
low demand and short run regulation are no longer covered by positive pro￿ts if second
period demand is high. Therefore, the regulator has to increase the price in the ￿rst
period to sustain investment incentives. Higher ￿rst period prices, however, diminish
￿rst period demand and hence erode the network e⁄ect. Overall it comes to a sudden
market breakdown at r ￿ 0:32.














First period pro￿ts of M

















Expected pro￿ts of M
Such a sudden market breakdown does not exist for long run regulation. While high
investment costs can be compensated by higher ￿rst period prices, the natural limit for
this mechanism is given by ￿rst period demand and again the network e⁄ect. The higher
the investment costs, the lower ￿rm￿ s M investment and the lower the probability for
higher demand in the second period.
Considering expected welfare, medium run regulation dominates long run regulation and
unregulated competition as long as investment costs are relatively low. With high invest-
ment costs unregulated competition leads to higher expected welfare when compared to
medium and long run regulation. While this is due to the ratchet e⁄ect under medium
run regulation, long run regulation serves as a simple commitment device but su⁄ers
from the induced inability to react to the actually realized demand in the second period.










Finally, note that with relatively low investment costs the potential welfare gains due to
regulation are rather low. On the other hand, high investment costs imply substantial
welfare losses due to medium or long run regulation.
5 Zero Pro￿t Constraints and Access Holidays
Given the results for medium run regulation and the huge welfare loss implied by market
breakdown due the ratchet e⁄ect, it is natural to ask, whether it is possible to improve
regulation by simple commitment devices which may help to overcome some of the incen-
tive problems analyzed above. First, we check whether the market breakdown problem
under medium run regulation can be alleviated by a simple zero-pro￿t constraint in the
second period. Then we consider access holidays which allow regulation only after an
unsuccessful market development, that is only, if the demand in the second period is the
same as in the ￿rst period. In order to complete the comparison between possible regu-
latory regimes we also consider the case in which regulation simply protects one ￿rm￿ s
monopoly but does not intervene in the monopoly pricing and investment decisions.
5.1 Zero pro￿t constraints
Amending medium run regulation with a zero-pro￿t restriction (m0) can alter the regu-
lator￿ s decision only if optimal prices would not lead to any further investment. That is,







￿ 0 and ￿
m0
2i (m2i;n2i) ￿ 0 (76)
25holds. While one would expect, that (76) tends to increase the investment incentives of
￿rm M in the ￿rst period and would therefore allow the regulator to choose a lower price
in the ￿rst period, inspection of (67), (68) and (69) indicates that some countervailing
e⁄ects should be taken into account as well. Most importantly, both ￿rms￿investment
incentives depend positively on the di⁄erence between second period pro￿ts with high and









21 ) in (68) and (69), respectively. Therefore, ensuring higher pro￿ts in the second
period also has a negative impact on ￿rst period investments. In fact, our example shows
that this countervailing e⁄ect can induce the regulator to choose a higher price in the
￿rst period as compared to unrestricted medium run regulation.
5.2 Access Holidays
Similar to a zero-pro￿t restriction access holidays (h) can be interpreted as an ex ante
commitment which narrows the regulator￿ s strategy space in the second period. While
providing access holidays may be an unconditional ex ante commitment we consider
access holidays conditioned on the development of the market. More speci￿cally, we
analyze a situation in which the regulator commits itself not to intervene if demand
realized in the second period is high.
Analyzing this kind of regulation formally, we can build on our analysis for an unregulated









21 in (59)￿ (64), respectively, shows that access holidays tend to increase
the ￿rms￿investment incentives by increasing the relative pro￿ts which can be earned
if demand shifts upwards. Note, however, that this positive e⁄ect is limited since the
regulator can still intervene in the second period if demand is low. Hence, the ￿rms are
facing the potential losses due to short run regulation once again. While access holidays
may alleviate the problem of regulation induced underinvestment in the ￿rst period,
access holidays can not solve the problem of market breakdown completely.
5.3 Protected Monopoly
Finally, the problem of potential market and regulation induced distortions with respect
to price competition and the investment behavior of the unregulated ￿rm may also call
for a protected monopoly (pm) which is well-known from the patent literature, but which
is seldom mentioned when discussing investment in telecommunication networks.
26In our model a protected monopoly leads to simple monopoly prices and investments
m
pm
2i in the second period:
￿
pm
2ip = F(m2i)((p ￿ c) ~ X2i + ~ X2i) = 0 (77)
￿
pm
2im = f(m2i)(p ￿ c) ~ X2i ￿ r ￿ 0; ￿
pm





2i denote the solutions of (77) and (78) and let ￿
pm
2i denote the respective













































As expected the market breakdown is alleviated by the zero pro￿t constraint, but the
implied negative incentive e⁄ects in period 1 also lead to relatively higher prices as
compared to unconstrained medium run regulation. Overall, zero pro￿t medium run
regulation is worse than the unregulated solution for medium and large network costs
r ￿ 0:2.
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First period networks of M
27Access holidays with regulatory intervention only in period 2 and only if demand is low
allow larger pro￿ts when demand is high. Hence, the market breakdown is postponed to
r ￿ 0:48. Furthermore, investment incentives are increased such that￿ for a large range
of network costs￿ prices are lower and network sizes are higher when compared to the
unregulated market outcome. Therefore, this regulation scheme performs very well for a
large range of medium and large network costs.











Our model combines elements of a natural monopoly (duplication of ￿xed costs) with
product di⁄erentiation gains. It is therefore not surprising that natural monopoly con-
siderations eventually dominate so that the solution in which N is not allowed to enter
the market is the best outcome for very large r ￿ 0:41.
6 Summary
It is well-known that telecommunication networks generate allocation problems which
cannot be solved perfectly by a competitive mechanism. Innovation, natural monopolies
and network e⁄ects generate externalities which lead to market failures, and which are
therefore widely accepted as challenging tasks for ex ante regulation. In this paper we
demonstrate that this conclusion is very optimistic. Before an active regulation policy is
justi￿ed, it has to be shown that a regulator has a realistic chance to improve the market
outcome if generally accepted restrictions are imposed on potential regulatory measures.
Instead of allowing every mechanism that satis￿es the ￿rms￿participation constraints
28we restricted our attention to a "third best" world in which the regulator can readjust
his decision until history determines the condition on which the policy is conditioned.
This way we introduced a natural trade-o⁄ between ￿ exibility and commitment of the
regulation policy.
Our example shows that several commonly held beliefs on the welfare potential of active
regulation are premature. Even in the one period model, third best regulation allows
to realize only a small part of the potential welfare gains under second best regulation.
Total surplus under third best regulation was almost indistinguishable from social welfare
under unregulated competition. Instead, we observed signi￿cant redistribution from the
producers to the consumers.
While this redistribution is a matter of social preferences, it generates a serious market
breakdown in the dynamic model. With medium run regulation the lack of commitment
makes it impossible to guarantee pro￿ts if network costs are high. With network e⁄ects
the implied market breakdown is even worse because a lack of investment in the ￿rst
period does not only destroy the actual consumer welfare, it also eliminates the chance
for further growth.
Network e⁄ects are also decisive for the relatively bad performance of long run regulation.
In the two period model with steady demand, long run regulation allows the realization of
the same allocation as medium run regulation in the one period model. Network e⁄ects,
however, call for relatively lower prices and higher investments in the ￿rst period, i.e.,
for ￿ exible pricing policies. Solving the commitment problem at the costs of ￿ exibility
reduces the welfare gains of regulation considerably.
Finally, our analysis of limited commitment devices demonstrates that regulation can
be improved by restricting the regulator￿ s possibilities to intervene in the market. While
access holidays conditional on the market development can increase social welfare they
do not resolve the breakdown problem for high investment costs. The good performance
of the protected monopoly shows that it is a mistake to ignore fundamental economic
insights gained in the patent literature.
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